re: "Amateurs Study Tactics"
"Ever since the Uzbek dictator Karimov kicked us out of K2 in 2005, OEF has been living on borrowed time, logistically. We lost our theater Class I collection point and distribution center, as well as access to European rail via Russia. American soldiers in Bavaria between 2002-2005 could load up their connexes and milvans on 5-tons, drive on down to the bahnhof, turn them over to the DB and expect them to arrive at their new FOB in the Hindu Kush safe and sound. I was there twice. Friends of mine were sent up there for the close out, which wasn’t pretty."
"Afghanistan has been starved of logistical support in comparison to Iraq, because it is a side show, an economy of force theater, and has been from the beginning, because logistically supporting a large American army on the opposite side of the planet far inland from the sea is too hard even for us. It is so hard for reasons of geography, topography, ethnology, criminology and technology that even the nation that put men on the moon can’t do it except at exorbitant cost. Saddam’s misfortune was that bin Laden got away, and we could logistically support major operations in Mesopotamia."
He explains why airlift-only logistics aren't practical:
"Bagram and Kandahar are the only major aerial ports of debarkation/embarkation. They have finite ramp space, and when they go Black on Class III, planes quit coming, or they come in light because they have to carry fuel to get back to Kuwait or Qatar or Dubai. The aviation infrastructure for another Operation Vittles just isn’t there."
"I was 19 when Saigon fell. I know what that did to my Army. I dread what the Fall of Kabul will do to it."