re: "Buying boots. The challenge of expanding U.S. land forces."
Hat tip to the Denizens at Castle Argghhh! for linking to this Armed Forces Journal article by Tom Donnelly.
Money quote(s):
"Although this is shameful for a nation as wealthy as the U.S., it is simply a fact that our political class does not think or act as though we are at war; yes, they are at war with one another, but not so much with our foreign enemies."
"Imposing "normal" budgetary procedures in a wartime environment may not be so wise."
"In recent years, the size of the active-duty Army — that is, regulars plus reservists and guardsmen called to active service — has consistently hovered between 600,000 and 625,000; the total number of Marines is less than 200,000. That's a pretty good measure of what it takes to sustain the level of effort demanded by the current strategy for Iraq, Afghanistan and other fronts in the Long War; by that measure, Gates' goal of 547,000 for the active Army is far too few. But if one thinks that the current strategy reflects an on-the-cheap approach to irregular warfare, these numbers would be too small. A better-educated guess at an Army able to sustain multiple Long War engagements — a 21st-century reckoning of the "two-and-a-half war" calculus that formed the basis of Cold War defense planning — would call for an active end strength of about 750,000. It would also begin to restore the Army National Guard to its traditional role as a strategic reserve; the current experiment in employing the National Guard as an "operational reserve" — that is, in sustaining Iraq rotations — has been an additional complicating factor in Long War strategy-making. The nature of the mission, a long-duration, constabulary-style, cavalry-on-the-frontier effort, calls first for a long-service, regular force."
&
"(T)hey also are numbers that require nearly a decade to achieve. What was taken apart so quickly and easily in the 1990s will not easily be put back together. The Army argues that it cannot accommodate more than an additional 30,000 soldiers per year given the small size of its training base. Although an expansion program should be designed to increase this capacity — a force of 750,000 would probably require recruiting 90,000 to 100,000 soldiers per year — a sufficient Army growth program will demand a sustained effort and a long recruiting war."
Money quote(s):
"Although this is shameful for a nation as wealthy as the U.S., it is simply a fact that our political class does not think or act as though we are at war; yes, they are at war with one another, but not so much with our foreign enemies."
"Imposing "normal" budgetary procedures in a wartime environment may not be so wise."
"In recent years, the size of the active-duty Army — that is, regulars plus reservists and guardsmen called to active service — has consistently hovered between 600,000 and 625,000; the total number of Marines is less than 200,000. That's a pretty good measure of what it takes to sustain the level of effort demanded by the current strategy for Iraq, Afghanistan and other fronts in the Long War; by that measure, Gates' goal of 547,000 for the active Army is far too few. But if one thinks that the current strategy reflects an on-the-cheap approach to irregular warfare, these numbers would be too small. A better-educated guess at an Army able to sustain multiple Long War engagements — a 21st-century reckoning of the "two-and-a-half war" calculus that formed the basis of Cold War defense planning — would call for an active end strength of about 750,000. It would also begin to restore the Army National Guard to its traditional role as a strategic reserve; the current experiment in employing the National Guard as an "operational reserve" — that is, in sustaining Iraq rotations — has been an additional complicating factor in Long War strategy-making. The nature of the mission, a long-duration, constabulary-style, cavalry-on-the-frontier effort, calls first for a long-service, regular force."
&
"(T)hey also are numbers that require nearly a decade to achieve. What was taken apart so quickly and easily in the 1990s will not easily be put back together. The Army argues that it cannot accommodate more than an additional 30,000 soldiers per year given the small size of its training base. Although an expansion program should be designed to increase this capacity — a force of 750,000 would probably require recruiting 90,000 to 100,000 soldiers per year — a sufficient Army growth program will demand a sustained effort and a long recruiting war."
posted by Consul-At-Arms at 12:00 AM
1 Comments:
The US Army just plain shrinks and grows as this country's strategic posture dictates. 232 years of experience prove this principle. Yet the personnel system has never really reflected this reality.
Specifically, the reserve components are designed for very temporary augmentation to the regulars, almost as an aberration. The GWOT has gone on longer than WWII, the previous record-holder for mass mobilizations. Also, both reserve and regular soldiers (mostly officers, but also senior NCOs) are subjected to the up-or-out, check-the-block system. Every year (even in wartime), fully-qualified people are denied promotions, then weeded out. For example, O-4's aren't picked up for O-5, and don't even make it to 20 years. Then a few years later, we decide we need more battalions: instead of getting the commanders/XO's/S-3's from the pool of seasoned majors that could have been standing by, we accelerate the promotion system on the existing captains/baby majors. Everyone loses: the Army because it lost valuable experience, the weeded-out officers because they lost their jobs, and the hurried-up officers because they are thrust into levels of responsibility for which they were unprepared.
Without the up/out system, the guys RIFted in the early 90's would still be on active duty - maybe as captains or SFC's with 14 years in grade, but still on active duty. Would you rather see the battalion commanders/XOs/S3/SGMs for the units being rapidly formed now come from such a pool, or from the accelerated-promoted guys who will wind up filling these slots in the current situation?
In addition to overthrowing the tyranny of the up/out system, I would like to see a revamped personnel system that allows soldiers to come in and out of active duty for relatively big chunks of time (2-5 years) over the course of a 20, 30, or even 40+ year 'career.' I put 'career' in scare quotes because the whole concept of a military career needs to be re-thought. Rather than a cookie-cutter approach where everyone checks the same blocks on the same timeline or gets dumped, the personnel system should recognize that some skills are more and less relevant at various times, so the person possessing those skills should be able to move in and out of active duty as appropriate.
The 19th-century British officer personnel system would be a pretty good model - not the part about buying commissions, but the part where officers went in and out of active duty as wars demanded, and in between did things like try to find the Northwest Passage, South Pole, etc.
And of course, my own career path: from country lawyer to unconventional warrior to diplomat!
The main nut & bolt legal/regulatory changes necessary here would be making the retirement system more portable (letting military members contribute to TSP was a good first step), and loosening the stranglehold of the promotion timelines.
What do you think, Consul?
JSM
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